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Abstract
Security attacks continue to emerge on daily basis due to the fast growth in the number of smart devices and mobile applications.
Attacks take diﬀerent malware forms such as Spyware and Trojan exploiting diﬀerent operating system vulnerabilities, specially
the well known vulnerable operating system; Android OS. In this paper, we study the malicious use of the “NotiﬁcationListener”
service in Android 4.3 and 5.0. A Trojan application, known as SMS backup, is developed to spy the notiﬁcations of other appli-
cations. Such an application requires only two permissions that include “Notiﬁcation Access” and “Internet”. These permissions
are used to extract and send user’s messages of other applications to the attacker’s email through Internet. Our malware is able to
alter and/or delete the notiﬁcation before being displayed. For experimental results, the malware was tested against notiﬁcations of
WhatsApp, BBM, SMS, and Facebook messenger using diﬀerent Android versions including Lollipop 5.0. Experiments show that
our malware succeeded against all the tested applications running Android version 4.3. Moreover, BBM and SMS messages are
still extractable in the newer version of Android (Lollipop 5.0).
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Spyware is a malware that spys the user’s activities. Such activities might include login information; username
and password, or personal ﬁles such as images and chat logs. However, as Spyware cannot easily spread on their
own, Trojans are used to hide them by oﬀering a legitimate functionality to the user. Norton statistics show that
37% of cybercrimes around the world are due to the combination of Spyware and Trojan1. Since Android dominates
the market share with 45.4%, most of the cybercrimes are designed to target such an operating system2. Aside
from the high number of Android users, the number of applications is increasing rapidly where there are about 2
million applications uploaded on Google Play store3. This rapid increase adds to the complexity of validating these
applications against their required permissions. For example, 61% of the applications that require the “READ SMS”
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permission are classiﬁed as malicious4, while only 12% requiring the same permission are benign. Lack of validation
resulted in almost 750 thousand attacks through Trojan SMS malware being detected and blocked by Kaspersky
products5. In addition to Google Play, unoﬃcial stores exist with high download rate of more than 800 thousand
downloads, despite their lower validation techniques6. This indicates that smart devices’ users are open to all types
of attacks especially for Android.
Since Android notiﬁcations are App-Controlled views, developers are allowed to customize them through appli-
cations without restrictions. Spamming and Phishing are the only two types of attacks that exploited the notiﬁcation
customization ability7. Spam notiﬁcations are prompt notiﬁcations containing a link to a malicious website that is
visited once the notiﬁcation is either dismissed or triggered. These notiﬁcations take the form of advertisements that
would attract the user to trigger them. On the other hand, phishing attacks are executed by posting a notiﬁcation that
replicates other applications’ notiﬁcations asking for the user’s credentials.
As far as we know, we are among the ﬁrst eﬀorts to maliciously use the “NotiﬁcationListener” service to spy and
share messages received by other applications such as WhatsApp, BBM, and Facebook messenger. An SMS backup
application is used as a Trojan to hide the Spyware Software activity of notiﬁcation extraction. Extraction is done by
reading notiﬁcation view ﬁelds, “bigContentView” and “TickerText”, of the received message. However, Android has
prevented reading “bigContentView” ﬁeld of other applications’ notiﬁcations starting “Lollipop” and later versions.
Thus, our malware can read WhatsApp, BBM and Facebook messages up to and including “Kitkat” version which
dominates the market with a share of 66.8%8. While, BBM messages are still extractable in Android Lollipop 5.0
because the message content is completely written in the “TickerText” ﬁeld that is still extractable. Also, our malware
leaks the SMS messages to the attacker for all Android versions, since it has “READ SMS” permission to provide the
front application functionality.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is the development of a Trojan Spyware that uses “Notiﬁcation
Access” and “Internet” permissions to extract and send information from an Android device to attacker’s email. The
application is considered a Trojan malware since it provides the users with useful functionalities; SMS backup and
notiﬁcation customization, while collecting users’ messages without their knowledge which is a Spyware activity. The
“Notiﬁcation Access” permits our malware to read and change notiﬁcations’ contents. Additionally, the “Internet”
permission is used to send extracted information to the attacker’s email without their knowledge. This malware has
been tested for diﬀerent Android versions including Lollipop 5.0 where we have shown the applicability of the attack
on all targeted applications before Lollipop 5.0, as well as BBM and SMS on version 5.0.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes literature review. Section 3 includes explanation
of the proposed application model. Section 4 illustrates the experimental results. Finally, section 5 includes proposed
suggestions to prevent this Trojan Spyware attack.
2. Literature Review
This section illustrates existing mobile phone Spyware attacks and the available detection techniques for Spyware.
2.1. Existing Mobile Spyware
Multiple Spy attacks targeting Android devices were reported. Spyware can be hidden in diﬀerent shapes and
spread in diﬀerent techniques in order to perform its malicious purpose which is usually data theft. “SW.SecurePhone”
and “SW.Qieting” are both two applications that work as Spyware to monitor user’s activities9. SW.SecurePhone starts
by running in the background after getting installed, then monitors the phone and stores the collected information
including calls and messages on the device’s SD Card. Every 20 minutes, these information are sent to a server over
the internet. However, SW.Qieting sends the collected messages to another mobile phone without user’s intervention
or knowledge.
Another mobile Spyware that has spread lately is called “FlexiSpy”10. This Spyware hides in applications that
pretend to be for your children’s protection or for catching cheating spouses. However, in the background, it collects
all the phone activities including SMS messages and call history.
In addition, Spamvertsing is a popular notiﬁcation malware that works by pushing advertisement to Android users.
Diﬀerent products like fake anti-viruses are advertised though attractive pop-up notiﬁcations shown to the user, while
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most of them being malicious ads11. Another form of fake notiﬁcations, login credentials requests for popular ap-
plications like Facebook such that the user is directed to the oﬃcial application after the user’s information has been
stolen7.
2.2. Spyware Detection Techniques
This section illustrates some detection techniques that are used to ﬁnd out spying activities on smart devices.
2.2.1. Signature Based Detection
Signature based anti-Spyware utilize a previously deﬁned database that contains a number of legitimate software.
It compares between the newly installed application and the ones in its database12. The problem with this detection
technique is that it needs to regularly update its database. Otherwise, the false negative detection rate would be too
high.
2.2.2. Behavior Based Detection
Behavior based anti-Spyware also utilize some pre-deﬁned database. However, this database contains the known
scenarios and behaviors for malicious and non-malicious activities. The problem with this method is that it is diﬃcult
to deﬁne accurately the behavior of a Spyware. Especially that a Spyware might be hidden inside applications that
claim to monitor a device. An example of behavior based detection technique proposed is called “Gatekeeper” which
manage Spyware by identifying and monitoring the “Auto-Start Extensibility Points” (ASEPs)13. ASEPs are the set
of extensibility points that allows programs to auto-start.
2.2.3. Data Mining Based Detection
In this type of detection, a classiﬁer is used to tell whether this application is a malicious software or not. A
classiﬁer is generated using existing malicious and non-malicious software databases12. The classiﬁer uses data
mining algorithms where it identiﬁes events or attributes that do not match the expected pattern deﬁned in the database.
Data mining was found to be more eﬀective than the other two techniques regarding Spyware detection.
2.2.4. Advanced Behavior Detection
A proposed advanced behavior Spyware detection technique do not detect a speciﬁc behavior of Spyware14. How-
ever, it detects general behavior of diﬀerent Spyware classes such as leaking information outside the applications’
limits. This technique works on reducing the percentage of false positives by combining static and dynamic anal-
ysis of Spyware behaviors. In addition, the technique used characterize applications’ behaviors precisely in their
interaction with browser events.
3. The Malware Model
In this section, our Trojan Spyware attack model is explained including the legitimate and malicious activities
along with snapshots of the malware. The application model ﬂowchart is shown in ﬁgure 1. In this ﬁgure, we show
the normal and malicious behaviors of the application where the green represents the Trojan’s activities and the red
represents the Spyware’s activities.
3.1. The Trojan Activity Model
The application provides the user with SMS messages backup feature along with a customized SMS notiﬁcation
with a reply option. Once the user starts the application, a pop-up message prompts him to enable the “Notiﬁcation
Access” permission from the settings to permit the application’s functionalities. After the permission is granted, the
user may enter his email in the text ﬁeld shown on the application’s main screen to activate the SMS backup feature.
While the email is registered, the application sends emails to the user every time a new SMS is received containing its
content. Moreover, SMS notiﬁcations are replaced with another containing a direct reply feature.
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Fig. 1: Application ﬂowchart
From implementation perspective, multiple services; “NotiﬁcationListener” and “smsReceiver”, run in the back-
ground and receive calls from the system when a new notiﬁcation is posted or an SMS is received respectively. Both
services start only when the user grants the “Notiﬁcation Access” permission to the application. The ﬁrst functional-
ity; backing up SMS messages, is implemented completely in the “onReceive()” method provided by “smsReceiver”
service, such that the new SMS content is extracted then sent via email to the user. The second functionality; replicat-
ing SMS notiﬁcation with additional features, is provided to the user by creating the replicate inside the “onReceive”
method while deleting the original notiﬁcation in the “cancelNotiﬁcation()” method of “NotiﬁcationListener” service.
3.2. The Trojan Views
The ﬁrst time the user runs the application, a pop-up message, shown in Figure 2a, is displayed prompting the user
to enable notiﬁcation access and directs him to notiﬁcation access settings page when clicking “OK” button. The user
will be able to see the application’s main screen as shown in Figure 2b after enabling notiﬁcation access. The main
screen contains an EditText element, accepts input in the format of an email address while declining any other input,
for the user to enter his backup email. Moreover, the new notiﬁcation as demonstrated in Figure 2c has a reply button
to view the reply ﬁeld dialog once clicked. The reply dialog containing an EditText element, shown in Figure 2d,
pops up to allow writing and sending a reply without closing the running application by clicking “send” button in the
dialog.
(a) Pop-up (b) Main screen (c) SMS notiﬁcation (d) Reply text box
Fig. 2: Application Interface
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(a) WhatApp notiﬁcation test (b) BBM notiﬁcation test (c) Facebook notiﬁcation test
Fig. 3: Spyware results on Android 4.3
3.3. The Spyware Activity Model
The attack activities run in the background using “NotiﬁcationListener” service to target Whatsapp, FacebookMes-
senger and BBM notiﬁcations. Once a notiﬁcation related to one of the targeted applications is posted, the message
content is extracted then sent to the attacker’s email. The message extraction is implemented in the “onNotiﬁca-
tionPosted” method by parsing “bigContentView” or “TickerText” ﬁelds of the notiﬁcation view. “bigContenView”
includes the message’s content while “TickerText” ﬁeld has the header of the message. Whatsapp, Facebook Mes-
senger messages are extracted by parsing “bigContentView”, meanwhile, “TickerText” is parsed to extract BBM
messages. For security purposes, Android has prevented access to “bigContentView” such that it returns “NULL” in
version 5.0 and later, keeping “TickerText” accessible. As BBM notiﬁcation’s structure include the complete message
in the “TickerText” ﬁeld, their messages are still extractable from the notiﬁcation in version 5.0 and later in contrast to
previously mentioned applications. That allows our Trojan Spyware to work for all targeted applications on “Kitkat”
and lower versions as well as BBM on “Lollipop” 5.0 and later.
4. The Malware Experimental Results
We have tested our malware using Galaxy S4 with two diﬀerent Android versions of Android 4.3 and 5.0. The
Spyware has been tested against multiple applications which are WhatsApp, BBM, SMS and Facebook messenger.
Table 1 shows the applicability of our Spyware on diﬀerent Android versions against the targeted applications.
According to our results and as shown in table 1, WhatsApp and Facebook messenger notiﬁcations’ content can
be extracted only in Android 4.3 and below. However, BBM and SMS messages can be sent to the attacker in both
versions; Android 4.3 and 5.0.
Results of spying on Android 4.3 notiﬁcations are demonstrated in ﬁgure 3. The notiﬁcation panel style which
is colored black with full screen panel shows that the smart device used support “Kitkat” version. In ﬁgure 3a, the
WhatsApp massage received is sent to the attacker’s email. In addition, ﬁgures 3b and 3c demonstrate BBM and
Facebook messenger notiﬁcations’ and the emails that were sent to the attacker respectively.
The test of our malware on Android 5.0 has been done against BBM and SMS messages. The SMS notiﬁcation
received is shown in ﬁgure 2b along with the email received by the attacker in ﬁgure 4a. On the other hand, ﬁgure 4b
demonstrates the BBM message the user received and the email with the message content sent to the attacker.
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Table 1: Applicability of opposed applications on Android versions.
Applications Android 4.3 Android 5.0
WhatApp  
Facebook Messenger  
BBM  
SMS  
5. Security Enhancement Solution
Solutions to such a Trojan Spyware are proposed in this section. Solutions depend on the application’s development
and accessibility of other applications.
5.1. Application’s Notiﬁcation Structure
In the new Android version Lollipop, applications cannot get the notiﬁcation view of other application to retrieve
their content, even if notiﬁcation access is granted. However, BBM notiﬁcation still includes the message and the
sender in the “TickerText” ﬁeld making it vulnerable since “TickerText” can be retrieved and used by other applica-
tions that have notiﬁcation access. Therefore, BBM has to consider changeing their notiﬁcation structure to secure
their messages against such an attack.
5.2. Notiﬁcation Access by Android
Most of the users are not aware of the permissions they give to the applications. Even if they are aware, they
overlook these permissions in return of the features applications provide. Therefore, Android should change the
notiﬁcation access permission to be only for applications with admin permission since sharing notiﬁcation contents is
not needed between applications.
(a) SMS attack test (b) BBM notiﬁcation test
Fig. 4: Spyware results on Android 5.0
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6. Conclusion
As smart devices are penetrating to people’s everyday life without the correct security measurements, diﬀerent
vulnerabilities are exploited on daily basis. A vulnerability that we targeted, in this work, was the “NotiﬁcationLis-
tener” service, where we have developed and tested an Android-based Trojan Spyware that exploited it. The Trojan
oﬀers the user with SMS message back-up and notiﬁcation customization services. Simultaneously, the Spyware App
runs on the background to forward all received notiﬁcations’ contents to the attacker’s email. Results showed that our
malware was able to successfully extract/update and forward messages from WhatsApp, BBM, Facebook Messenger
and SMS messages for Android devices running Kitkat 4.3. Moreover, our results showed the applicability of our
malware on BBM and SMS messages with devices running Lollipop 5.0. This is due to the misuse of the notiﬁcation
structure that BBM application supports and due to the abuse of the “SMS READ” permission which is needed by
SMS messages.
Acknowledgment
This work has been supported by Khalifa University of Science, Technology & Research (KUSTAR), the As-
sociated Research Unit of the National Council for Scientiﬁc Research, CNRS-Lebanon, and Lebanese American
University (LAU).
References
1. Ae.norton.com . Trojan horse - trojans - spyware - cybercrime — norton uk. 2016. URL: http://ae.norton.com/
cybercrime-trojansspyware.
2. Burguera I, Zurutuza U, Nadjim-Tehrani S. Crowdroid: behavior-based malware detection system for Android. ACM; 2016, p. 15–26.
3. Appbrain.com . Android operating system statistics - appbrain. 2016. URL: http://www.appbrain.com/stats/.
4. Guo C, Xu J, Liu L, Xu S. Using association statistics to rank risk of android application. In: Computer and Communications (ICCC), 2015
IEEE International Conference on. 2015, p. 6–10. doi:10.1109/CompComm.2015.7387530.
5. Kaspersky.com . The number of ﬁnancial attacks against android users tripled in 2014
— kaspersky lab. 2016. URL: http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2015/
The-Number-of-Financial-Attacks-Against-Android-Users-Tripled-in-2014.
6. Abura’ed N, Otrok H, Mizouni R, Bentahar J. Mobile phishing attack for android platform. In: Innovations in Information Technology
(INNOVATIONS), 2014 10th International Conference on. 2014, p. 18–23. doi:10.1109/INNOVATIONS.2014.6987555.
7. Xu Z, Zhu S. Abusing notiﬁcation services on smartphones for phishing and spamming. In: Presented as part of the 6th USENIXWorkshop on
Oﬀensive Technologies. Bellevue, WA: USENIX; 2012,URL: https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12/workshop-program/
presentation/Xu.
8. Developer.android.com . Dashboards — android developers. 2016. URL: http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/
index.html.
9. tagkey20113. Android marketplace hit by malware. Computer Fraud & Security 2011;2011(3):3 –. URL: http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S1361372311700252. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1361-3723(11)70025-2.
10. Xu N, Jia W. Numen: Where and what are you doing now. In: System Science and Engineering (ICSSE), 2010 International Conference on.
2010, p. 338–43. doi:10.1109/ICSSE.2010.5551723.
11. Mansﬁeld-Devine S. Android malware and mitigations. Network Security 2012;2012(11):12 – 20. URL: http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S1353485812701046. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1353-4858(12)70104-6.
12. Ha P. Malicious android spyware creator faces up to 10 years in prison. 2016. URL: http://www.neowin.net/news/
malicious-android-spyware-creator-faces-up-to-10-years-in-prison.
13. Wang YM, Roussev R, Verbowski C, Johnson A, Wu MW, Huang Y, et al. Gatekeeper: Monitoring Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs)
for Spyware Management. USENIX; 2004, p. 33–46.
14. Kirda E, Kruegel C, Banks G, Vigna G, Kemmerer R. Behavior-based Spyware Detection. Usenix; 2006, p. 273–88. URL: http://static.
usenix.org/legacy/events/sec06/tech/full_papers/kirda/kirda_html/.
